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TRANSNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE
POLITICS OF SHAME
James N. Rosenau"
Since my work on world affairs is sensitive to the legal dimensions of
the course of events, it is an especial pleasure to participate for the first
time in a meeting of the International Law Association. But I must note at
the outset that I am somewhat illiterate in the both the practice and study of
international law. My sensitivity to the relevance of the legal context that
infuses any international situation has never superseded my preoccupation
with other dimensions of such situations. Hence my illiteracy stems from
always locating questions of law in more encompassing political, social,
and economic contexts. Such is the case with this panel. The questions
we shall address are essentially political questions, or at least my
comments on them will perforce focus on other than their legal aspects.
Indeed, my main message largely involves epistemology and
methodology, the need to be clear what we mean by certain terms and to
approach their implications in a cautious and nuanced way. With the
world undergoing powerful challenges marked by huge uncertainties,
pervasive contradictions, and endless ambiguities, it is not easy to trace
nuance. It is easier to yield to the temptation to come up with clear-cut
and simple solutions rather than to extend ourselves to avoid falling into a
wide rage of definitional and epistemological traps.
Perhaps the most dangerous trap involves what I call the "domestic
analogy": The tendency to think about the problem of accountability at the
international level as if we had domestic processes in mind. Even if one
accepts that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the domestic and
international worlds-as I do not-the procedures that allow for
accountability in domestic systems cannot be developed in an international
context. Or at least the practice of holding elected officials and
administrations responsible for what happens on their watch cannot be
duplicated in international settings. The reasons are numerous.
International organizations are run by states that are not accountable to
Professor of Law, George Washington University. This paper was prepared for the
Opening Panel of the Annual Meeting of the American Branch of the International Law
Association, New York, New York, October 25, 2001.
1. See JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING
GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD (1997).
354 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:353
their domestic publics for how they vote because such votes are not
politically salient. NGOs and transnational advocacy groups are not
accountable to their memberships in any meaningful way. In some their
leaders may be elected by their memberships, but this form of
accountability is rare and it is ineffective in those rare cases when it is
operative. Corporations are accountable to their stockholders, but they
usually manage to prevent dissident stockholders from having any
consequence. In short, elections in which individual citizens or members
have any say in what transnational collectivities do or plan are either
nonexistent or superficial. Accordingly, it is far-fetched to ponder how
accountability can be achieved through the domestic methods that allow for
the ouster of old leaderships and the election of new ones. The traditional
definition of democratic practice simply does not apply in the case of
transnational and international collectivities.
Does this mean that transnational accountability cannot be achieved?
No, it does not if one can break free of the stranglehold that the domestic
analogy has on our thinking. There are mechanisms for maximizing rather
than minimizing accountability beyond domestic boundaries. They may
not be adequate from a domestic perspective, but they can be more rather
than less effective if different criteria of effectiveness are employed.
A second mistake to avoid is that of focusing on radical rather than
practical changes. There is no reason to believe that proposals to replace
the IMF and World Bank, or to enlarge the membership of the UN
Security Council, or to create a .third house of the United Nations that
represents civil society-to mention just some of the radical proposals that
have been bandied about-can ever be realized. To borrow a social
science concept, the course of global affairs, like that of any large
organization or society, is too path dependent, too habituated to set ways of
getting from one day to the next, to undertake radical changes of course.
As noted below, however, there is a host of less encompassing and more
practical steps that can be taken to enhance the transparency and
responsiveness of the prevailing international architecture.
A third trap to avoid is that of aspiring to one instrument of
accountability suitable to all situations. The world is too diverse, its
dependent pathways too numerous and too pervaded with contradictions,
for any single mechanism to be sufficient.
But, despite the diversity, and notwithstanding the deeply entrenched
pathways in which the course of events are ensconced, there are
mechanisms for enhancing the accountability of the present international
architecture. Some of these are linked to the continuing disaggregation of
world affairs. My view of the current scene is one in which traditional
centers of authority are breaking down and new ones proliferating, with
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the result that the global stage is ever more dense with both governmental
and nongovernmental collectivities that enjoy sufficient legitimacy with
their followers to act on their behalf.2 More than that, the advent of the
Internet and other micro-electronic technologies have facilitated extensive
networking among NGOs. There is strength and accountability in the
complexity of this surfeit of ever-proliferating transnational actors and
their networks. Their growing numbers make it increasingly difficult for
any one actor, or any coalition of actors, to act imperiously and without
being held to account. To be sure, the density of the global stage renders
the chances of wide consensus's in response to the challenges of our time
highly problematic. But muddling through in the absence of broad
consensus's is not a bad price to pay for greater accountability.
Put differently, the pathways on which the world is dependent have
undergone a major bifurcation. There are now two worlds of world
politics: the state-centric world that has presided over global structures for
centuries and what I call the multi-centric world, which encompasses the
wide range of new actors that have clambered onto the global stage and
that have the authority to challenge, cooperate, or otherwise interact with
the state-centric world and its institutions. Some analysts refer to the state-
centric world's new rival as civil society, but I prefer to view it as a multi-
centric world in order to allow for a diversity that includes corporations,
professional societies, and other entities as well as the advocacy groups
that are usually viewed as the core of civil society. Indeed, using the letter
"n" to represent any number, one can say that the emergent structure of
bifurcation is best labeled as an "nfurcation" of world politics.
But this is not to downplay the relevance of advocacy groups. The
boisterous politics of shame they practice through their recurrent protests
against international financial institutions (IFs) is not without
consequence. They have succeeded in elevating the rich-poor gap and the
pervasiveness of poverty to a perch high on the global agenda. There is
more than a little evidence that their messages are being heard in corporate
boardrooms- and the halls of governments. It is not far-fetched to
anticipate that the accountability and transparency of IFIs will be
considerably expanded in the coming years through the publication of their
board minutes, country-assistance strategies, letters of intent, internal
evaluations, and other documentary evidence of their decisions and actions.
Conceivably, too, the politics of shame will contribute to bargaining that
results in more seats for developing countries on the IFI boards and the
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establishment of think tanks to provide independent analyses and advice to
the boards.
Needless to say, the politics of shame is not dependent on recourse to
violent protests. On the contrary, the shaming messages get overridden
and lost when protests turn violent.
Of course, there are other mechanisms besides that of publicity
through shaming protests. Shame can take the form of publishing statistics
such as the annual corruption index released by Transparency International
(TI). Quiet pressures can also be effective. Rather than sponsor mass
protests, for example, TI devotes most of its resources and energies to
negotiating with the elites that preside over IFIs and other international
institutions rather than mobilizing mass publics.,
If time permitted, one could list a number of other mechanisms for
furthering accountability without reliance on the domestic analogy. Most
of these involve working with international organizations and national
governments to promote further disaggregation, thus bringing transnational
decisions closer to the people and publics affected by them. And it is with
respect to these mechanisms that the legal profession has a huge role to
play inasmuch as treaties and public policies will have to be rewritten to
achieve desirable levels of decentralization. But elaborating these
mechanisms will take me beyond my allotted time. And having already
indicated that my legal competencies are limited, that is just as well. For
now it is enough to stress that while the storehoise of potentially effective
accountability mechanisms may not be overflowing, it is full.4 And there is
no dearth of able individuals and organizations, including my colleagues on
the panel and in the audience, committed to enumerating, analyzing, and
implementing them.
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